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Abstract
Like most other developing countries, China experiences huge migration outflows
from rural areas. Their most striking characteristic is a high geographical and tem-
poral mobility. Rural migrants keep going back and forth between origin villages and
destination areas. In this paper, we show that this temporary feature of migration
can be linked to land rights insecurity. As village land ownership remains collective
and as land use rights can be periodically reallocated, individual out-migration can
result in deprivation of those rights. Moreover, the intensity of this insecurity varies
according to the village-level management of land and the contractual status of land
plots.
We use these variations to identify the effect of land rights insecurity on migration
behavior. Empirical results based on representative 2002 rural data demonstrate
substantial impact.
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Introduction
According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the Chinese rural workforce
amounted to 478.52 million people at the end of 2006 (see NBS (2006)). Of these,
131.81 million were migrant workers (nongmingong). Out-migration thus affects more
than a quarter of the Chinese rural labor force. The individual characteristics, origins
and destinations of Chinese rural migrants, as well as the impact of migration on Chinese
urbanization and industrialization, have been well documented and analyzed.
Besides its numerical importance, another striking feature of this rural migrant pop-
ulation is its temporal and geographical mobility. For example, according to the results
of a survey carried on in 2005 by the State Council Research Bureau on rural migrants
(see State Council Research Bureau (2006)), only 8.13% of the interviewed migrants
declared that they planned a long term stay at their migration destination. The over-
whelming majority of this population is therefore mobile, and indeed, rural migrants
have been referred to, both in the Chinese media and in academic and political circles,
as the “floating population” (liudong renkou). This extreme mobility of migrants can
have important consequences for Chinese economic development. For example, in re-
cent years, numerous developed coastal provinces have faced sudden “migrant worker
shortages” (nongmin huang), jeopardizing production in labor-intensive, export-oriented
industries.
This temporary pattern of rural out-migration does not fit the famous baseline mi-
gration models of Lewis (1954) and Harris and Todaro (1970). It is not specific to China,
and the temporary migration phenomenon has already given birth to a wide literature
in economics. The reasons invoked are: changes in the income differentials between ori-
gin and destination areas due for example to agricultural seasonality (Knight and Song
(2003)), exogenous shocks on the legal and/or professional situations of migrants (Galor
and Stark (1990)), psychological costs of migration, especially family ties (Djajic and
Milbourne (1988)), a process of geographical job searching (Bhattacharya (1990)), and,
finally, the desire of rural households to spread risks among sectors and localities (Stark
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and Levhari (1982), Stark and Bloom (1985)). However, on the empirical side, studies
on the reasons of temporary migration remain scarce.
In this paper, we aim to show that this temporary feature of migration can also
be linked to land rights insecurity. More specifically, our hypothesis is that land rights
insecurity hinders migration, as the land use rights of out-migrating people can be seized
during their absence. When exposed to a higher degree of insecurity, rural workers must
migrate less, or for shorter periods. We thus focus on the link between the migration de-
cisions of rural people and maybe the most important element of their rural environment:
land.
This issue of land rights insecurity in developing countries has already been the
subject of numerous empirical studies, focusing on productive investment (Goldstein
and Udry (2008) for Ghana, Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle (2002) for China, Gautam, Dercon,
and Ali (2007) for Ethiopia, to name just some of the most interesting articles), or labor
allocation (Field (2007) for Peru, Lohmar (1999) and Shi (2004) in the case of China).
All these works face a common problem: how to identify the impact of land rights
insecurity on individual behaviors? Some rely on instruments (such as Shi (2004)) while
others use institutional variations in the definition of land rights (such as Goldstein and
Udry (2008), Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle (2002) or Field (2007)). In this paper, we opt for
a methodology close to this second solution. We use land rights heterogeneity across
household plots in a model with village fixed effects to capture the impact of village land
rights manipulation on out-migration. This strategy allows us to solve causality and en-
dogeneity issues entailed by land arrangements at the village level. Indeed, village land
management may respond to village migration history, or to village characteristics that
affect migration as well. Yet, household exposure to village-level risk of land manipula-
tion varies according to the type of plot tenure. While the type of tenure alone may raise
endogeneity concerns, its interaction with village-level insecurity does not, once village
fixed effects are taken into account. We are therefore able to identify the impact of land
rights insecurity on migration behavior. Empirically, this approach is made possible by
the width and the quality of the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) household
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survey, which gives detailed individual-level and village-level information on almost 9
200 rural Chinese households distributed in 961 villages all over China. Using Honore´
(1992)’s semi-parametric identically censored least squares estimator, we actually find
that the interaction between our indicator of village-level insecurity and a measure of
the exposure of household plots to administrative seizure has a significant impact on
rural households migration decisions: land rights insecurity does constrain migration
behaviors and shortens out-migration durations for Chinese rural workers.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we delineate the migration phenomenon in
contemporary China, and describe the main characteristics of land institutions. Second,
we design a simple theoretical framework in order to formally establish the link between
idiosyncratic land rights insecurity and migration decisions. This leads to our third
section, namely empirical results.
1 Migration and Land Rights in China
The purpose of this first section is to provide a general picture of the temporary di-
mension of the migration phenomenon in China, and to see how it can be linked with
the land rights insecurity generated by the institutional context of Chinese rural land
management.
CHIP Survey Description
The following figures are based on past studies as well as descriptive statistics drawn
from our data. Throughout this article, we rely on the Chinese Household Income
Project (CHIP) cross-section survey conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences (CASS) in 2003. This was carried out during the 2003 Spring Festival, and inves-
tigated the situation of rural households during the preceding year. This survey has four
main advantages. First, the set of questions was quite comprehensive, and deals with a
large number of aspects of the lives of rural households. Second, the survey sample is
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very wide: 37 969 people, from 9 200 households distributed across 961 villages,1 were
interviewed. The sample was chosen according to NBS data in order to be represen-
tative of the whole Chinese population. And for dimensions like age structure, gender
ratio, or household composition, the survey results do indeed appear to be extremely
similar to national statistics. Third, it was conducted during the Spring Festival, a time
of traditional familial gathering. Consequently, a lot of migrants had returned to their
hometown for the occasion and were present. Fourth, this individual and household level
survey is complemented by extensive data on village level characteristics.
Migration Definition and Sample Representativeness
Migration is defined in relation to two criteria: work place, and work duration. For the
purpose of this study, especially focused on the temporal dimension of migration, we
define as a migrant in 2002 any individual who declared he worked out of his usual place
of residence, whatever the duration of his out-migration. The only restriction we put on
this definition is that the place of migrant work must not only be out of the individual’s
home village (cun) and township (xiang), but also out of the individual’s home county
(xian2), in order to rule out commuters and keep only genuine migrants.
Table 1 displays the distribution of the CHIP survey labor force according to the
workers’ primary work place. Using our definition of migration and according to the
survey results, 15,4%3 of rural workers migrated in 2002, yielding an estimated national
population of 93 million rural migrants. This fits remarkably well with official national
statistics for 2002, of 94 millions rural migrants (Huang and Pieke (2003)), although our
definition of migration differs from the NBS one4. These results give some evidence of
122 provinces are sampled: (listed from East to West, and from North to South) Jilin, Liaoning,
Beijing, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Jiangxi, Hunan,
Shaanxi, Chongqing, Guizhou, Guangxi, Xinjiang, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan. The survey covers 37 969
individuals of 9 200 households, in 961 villages distributed over 122 counties in these 22 provinces.
2There are four formal levels in the Chinese administrative structure, which, ranking from highest to
lowest, are: province, prefecture, county and township. Villages are informal organizational levels below
the township.
3We include as migrants in our definition workers declaring migrant work as a secondary occupation,
which explains why the 15.4% figure is higher than the one computed from the fourth and fifth lines of
table 1.
4The Chinese National Bureau of Statistics defines a migrant worker as an individual who has left
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the sample representativeness.
TABLE 1 HERE
Moreover, the characteristics of rural migrants in the 2002 CHIP survey are similar
to those found in previous studies. As shown in table 2, compared to other rural people,
migrants are younger, more educated, and more likely to be male and single. Migrant
workers are less likely to be married, and less likely to be the head of household. More-
over, they are mainly long distance migrants, as a majority of them cross provincial
borders. These results are very similar to the descriptive statistics given in other studies
on Chinese rural migrants (see for example the aforementioned Huang and Pieke (2003),
the reference works of Yao Zhaohui, Zhao (1999b) and Zhao (1999a), or the study of Li
and Zanhiser (2002) on the 1995 CHIP survey).
TABLE 2 HERE
1.1 Rural Migrations in China
The diversity of the individual situations of rural migrant workers, often at the fringes
of legality, as well as their high temporal and geographical mobility, challenges statisti-
cal tools. However, existing studies converge to a commonly accepted estimate of the
growth in size of this population from around 2 million in the mid-1980s to about 94
million in 2002 (Huang and Pieke (2003)), and over 131 million by 2006 (State Council
Research Bureau (2006)). That would mean that in China, at the beginning of the 21st
century, one worker out of six is a rural migrant.
The related economic literature, on the micro side, has focused mainly on the specific
characteristics of migrant people, holding the classical Todarian point of view that labor
income differentials were the main motive for migrations (Todaro (1969) and Harris and
Todaro (1970)). Moreover, on the macro side, much of the political and social debate
about Chinese internal migrations seems to be based on the implicit assumption that
the underlying forces behind this phenomenon are comparable to the ones that caused
rural depopulation in industrializing Europe and in most developing countries during the
his registered place of residence in order to work, for at least 6 months in a given year.
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last two centuries. Rural out-migration flows are thus seen, in a Lewisian way (Lewis
(1954)), as the shift of the agricultural “surplus labor” to the modern sectors, fueling
capital accumulation, industrialization and urbanization.
However, a striking feature of rural migration flows in China does not fit the classical
Lewisian-Todarian framework: their temporary nature. Indeed, it appears that most
rural migrants come back to their home rural area, after some years spent working on
urban informal labor markets, as noted, for example, by Murphy (2002). Out-migration
thus seems to be a step in the life-cycle scheme of rural people. This impression is
further confirmed by what has been called, in recent years, the “40 years phenomenon”
(sishi sui xianxiang): in cities, virtually all rural migrant workers are under 40 years
old. “Return migration” (huiliu) flows have also begun to draw attention. For example,
as mentioned in the introduction, among the rural migrants surveyed for the Chinese
rural migrant workers survey research report (State Council Research Bureau (2006)),
only 8.13% declared that they planned a long term stay at the destination city, whereas
39.07% intend to go back to their hometown as soon as they have accumulated enough
savings. In our data, about 75% of the rural migrants are less than 35 years old, that is,
in the first part of their working life. All these points are consistent with the view that
out-migration characterizes the first part of a rural individual’s working life.
Moreover, during this migration stage of their lives, rural migrants keep on moving
back and forth between home villages and destination areas (see Cook and Maurer-Fazio
(1999)). For example, in the 2002 CHIP sample, only 5% of the migrants did not return
to their home villages in 2002, and 60% of them spent less than 9 months outside their
home counties. The distribution of the rural migrants according to the duration of their
out-migration in 2002, plotted in figure 1, clearly reflects this temporary feature of rural
migrations.
FIGURE 1 HERE
The rural migrant population of China thus displays a striking temporal character-
istic: out-migration constitutes a transitory stage in a rural individual life pattern, and
is a phenomenon of repeated moves between home and destination areas, rather than
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a more or less permanent settling. This paper deals with this second aspect of migra-
tion temporality. Many factors are likely to play a role in rural individuals’ decisions
regarding migration, and especially out-migration duration. Our hypothesis here is that
land rights insecurity hinders out-migration, and especially shortens migration duration,
because the longer people out-migrate, the more likely they are to be deprived of their
land use rights.
1.2 Land Rights Insecurity in China
The purpose of this section is twofold. The first aim is to establish that there is land
rights insecurity in China. The second is to present the variation in the intensity of this
insecurity, across and within villages, that will eventually be used for the econometric
investigation.
The Hukou System and the Rural-Urban Divide
Since the 1950s, Chinese people have been recorded in the “Household Registration
System” or hukou framework. In the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese individuals’ places of
residence and work were strictly defined through this institution.5 Although the controls
on mobility have been loosened over the last two decades, the very existence of this
hukou system still constrains the moves of rural people, mainly because, as Solinger
(1999) synthetically states, “civil/social rights and prerogatives, such as the right to
subsistence, education, dwelling, employment, and medical care are denied to migrants
in the cities”. Rural migrants thus remain second-class citizens in urban areas, and
though the hukou rural/urban divide is clearly less hermetic since the beginning of the
reform era, it still firmly hinders rural migrants from settling permanently in cities.
Symmetrically, this institution guarantees, for a rural hukou holder, the access to a
piece of land. This land holding cannot be sold, and roughly substitutes for the social
services and public goods rural people cannot access.
5A comprehensive depiction of the hukou system and its evolution can be found in: Cheng and Selden
(1994). Evolutions of this system in the 1980s and 1990s are related in: Chan and Li (1999). The most
recent overviews of this institution can be found in Wang (2004) and Chan and Buckingham (2008).
8
This point is important for our study, for the hukou system constrains out-migrating
rural people to eventually come back to their home villages, and establishes an institu-
tional link between rural workers and agricultural land.
The “Household Responsibility System” and Land Rights Insecurity
The decollectivization of the rural economy and agricultural production, initiated in
China at the end of the 1970s, has only been partial. At the beginning of the 1980s, the
rural People’s Communes were dismantled,6 but property rights on land have remained
in the hands of village collective authorities. Rural households have only been conceded
land use rights, intended to be implemented through a well-defined contractual frame-
work, the “Household Responsibility System” (jiating lianchan chengbao zeren zhidu),
but contracts, and especially the length of contracts, have not been respected by collec-
tive authorities. They have kept the habit of periodically reallocating land among their
fellow villagers. This situation creates manifest uncertainty for rural households about
the durability of their land tenure. This land rights insecurity and the correlative possi-
ble abuses from administrative authorities regularly give birth to outbursts of farmers’
anger, which sometimes receive media coverage. It also attracts interest from political
and academic circles, because of the consequences it may have for the investment deci-
sions of Chinese rural households (Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle (2002)) and labor allocation
(Lohmar (1999), Shi (2004)).
The common problem faced by all studies on land right insecurity and its conse-
quences is that insecurity cannot be easily measured, and is potentially endogenous to
the outcome of interest. Solutions include the estimation of “hazards of expropriation”
for given plots (Jacoby, Li, and Rozelle (2002)), the use of instruments (Shi (2004) in-
struments village-level land rights insecurity with centrally imposed land re-contracting),
or the use of various dimensions of variation in the intensity of land rights insecurity
faced by individuals (as Goldstein and Udry (2008) did in the case of Ghana, using in-
6A general description of the “Household Responsibility System” can be found in Krusekopf (2002)
and in Brandt, Huang, Li, and Scott (2002).
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dividuals’ positions in the political hierarchy with regard to specific plots). The method
we use here is close to this last solution. To identify the impact of land rights insecurity
on migration duration, we rely on the interaction of two dimensions of variation of inse-
curity: the across-village variation, depending on differences in each village’s collective
management of land, and within-village, across-plot variation, depending on the differ-
ent contractual status of land plots. These two dimensions of variation are presented in
the next section.
Dimensions of Land Rights Insecurity
Collective Management of Land The “Household Responsibility System” frame-
work was intended to be homogeneous throughout mainland China. However, its actual
implementation by village authorities has taken very diverse forms. Despite the existence
of land contracts, administrative redistributions have persisted, but their frequency and
their criteria have differed considerably from one village to another, as Kung and Liu
(1997) or Liu, Carter, and Yao (1998), for example, have documented. The involvement
of village authorities in the actual management and allocation of agricultural land is ex-
tremely variable. In some villages, farmers’ land use rights have effectively been enforced
and protected, leading to a situation where land use rights are “quasi-private” (see Kung
(2002)). In other places, collective land is periodically redistributed. This redistribution
can take different forms, of varying extent, from the use of collective “flexible land” or
“reserve fields” (jidong tian) to small scale reallocation (xiao tiaozheng) and village-wide
land redistribution (da tiaozheng).
Decisions on land reallocation can be taken either at the administrative or at the nat-
ural village level (an administrative village gathers several natural villages). According
to the 2002 CHIP survey data, reallocations are usually decided at the natural village
level. Only one fifth of the reallocations were decided at the administrative village level.
Land management policies thus generally respond to micro level decisions. The charac-
teristics of village leaders and local interactions between villagers and their leaders play
a key role in land rights determination, as Rozelle and Li (1998) stressed.
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Despite central state regulations to limit administrative land reallocation, 40% of
the villages surveyed in 2002 had conducted at least one land reallocation since 1998.
In some of them, adjustments even occurred almost every single year. In 23% of the
villages, authorities retained some collective “reserve fields” in 2002.
The first dimension of variation in land rights insecurity is thus a village-level one, as
the definition and stability of individual land use rights vary from one village to another,
according to local political choices regarding agricultural land management and actual
implementation of the “Household Responsibility System”.
In this study, the variable we use to indicate the village-level dimension of insecurity
is whether the village has retained some land in 2002 for adjustment (jidong tian, which
is often translated as “reserve field” or “flexible land”). The existence of “flexible land”
in 2002 means that there is room for land reallocation: land has been taken that can be
redistributed. It thus indicates administrative land transfers at the village level. More-
over, it appears that these “reserve fields” have often been used by collective authorities
in order to manipulate farmers and eventually increase levies, a practice that has been
condemned by the Ministry of Agriculture since 1995 (see Cheng and Tsang (1996)).
If a village retained “flexible land” in 2002, it thus indicates that there is village-level
insecurity regarding land allocation.
Contractual Status of Plots In the framework of the “Household Responsibility
System”, different kinds of contracts on land are defined. Five major tenure types are
officially sanctioned by the national government, each of them embodying a different set
of rights and duties:7 private plot (ziliu di), grain ration land (kouliang tian), contract
land (chengbao tian), responsibility land (zeren tian) and reclaimed land (kaihuang di).
Each tenure type encompasses a different set of rights and obligations for rural house-
holds, and guarantees a different level of security.
Historically, the distinction between grain ration land and responsibility land ap-
peared during the 1980s, when the institutional arrangement known as the “two fields
7For a precise and comprehensive account of different types of tenure in China, see the aforementioned
article of Brandt, Huang, Li, and Scott (2002).
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system” (liang tian zhi) was experimented. First set up at the end of the 1980s in some
counties of the Shandong povince, among which the most famous is Pingdu, this system
progressively spread over China during the 1990s. Cheng and Tsang (1996) summarize
this system as follows: “Under this scheme, some parts of the land are to be evenly dis-
tributed among the rural households as kouliang tian (land for the production of grain
for self-consumption) with permanent tenancy rights. The remaining land is to be leased
as shangpin tian (commodity land) or zeren tian (responsibility land) to grain-growing
specialists by open bidding. Agricultural taxation and obligations to fulfill the state pro-
curement quota are applied to the latter only”. As is generally the case in rural China,
official regulations and recommendations have not been directly and homogeneously im-
plemented, and there have been local variations in the actual definition of the bundles
of rights attached to grain-ration land and to responsibility land. Nevertheless, the
founding principle has remained: kouliang tian is intended to enable farmers “to retain
some land to secure their food supply” (Cheng and Tsang (1996)), whereas zeren tian is
meant to be used to produce for the market and for the authorities, through quotas and
taxes. Grain ration land plots are thus more secure than responsibility land, that is to
say grain ration land is less likely to be seized and reallocated in case of out-migration
because it is precisely designed to act as a “safety net” for farmers.
To simplify the analysis, we will divide households’ land holdings into two general
contractual types: grain ration and responsibility land. Private plots being qualitatively
comparable and quantitatively marginal compared to grain ration land, we will include
them under the label “grain ration land”. For similar reasons, the label “responsibility
land” covers responsibility land, contract land and reclaimed land.
Our hypothesis is that when land rights are jeopardized at the village level, rural
individuals facing a lower insecurity on their land holdings should be more likely to
migrate than those with higher insecurity. To formally express this hypothesis, we
design, in the next section, a simple model, to analyze the allocation of a rural agent
labor between migration and agriculture, taking into account these two dimensions of
land rights insecurity.
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2 A Model of Temporary Migration with Insecure Land
Rights
We design here a very simple model of a rural household migration decision in a context
of land rights insecurity. This illustrative model carries out two objectives. First, it
enables to determine under which conditions land rights insecurity has an impact on
migration decisions. Second, it formally introduces and justifies the empirical method
we use to identify the impact of land rights insecurity on migration decisions, that is,
the interaction between village-level land rights insecurity and the contractual structure
of rural households’ land tenure.
2.1 Framework
In this study, decisions are studied at the household level rather than the individual
level. In fact, land plots are, in most of the cases, contractually granted to farmers
households, and not to individuals. In any case, the 2002 CHIP questionnaire collected
information on land at the household level. This also implies that we will consider that
labor allocation decisions, and especially migration decisions, are taken at the household
level. We will thus adopt an unitary conception of the household8. Even when individuals
out-migrate, income pooling still occurs at the household level. A unitary view of Chinese
rural households should thus not be too misleading.
Household Endowments and Life Cycle
A household life-cycle is divided into two periods. During the first, the household can
decide to allocate some work time to migration, while in the second one it definitively
settles down in the rural area. That constraint makes the model much more tractable
8Without denying that household decisions are the results of intra-household negotiation and bar-
gaining, the unitary model seems to be quite relevant in the Chinese case, especially for the matter of
migration decisions. As rural migrant workers are usually relegated to a secondary status in Chinese
cities, and are denied access to urban social services, or even formal urban housing, they are constrained
not to consume in urban areas, and to save and remit a huge part of their earnings to their rural
household.
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without modifying the central result, and seems to be realistic. Indeed, as mentioned
earlier, for most Chinese rural individuals and households, migration appears to be a
first step, a first period of their life-cycle, before a definitive return and settling in rural
areas.
The household is endowed with a quantity of labor L, constant over time. It is also
endowed with an overall quantity of land T1, which includes both its “grain ration land”,
TG1, and its “responsibility land”, TR1. As explained earlier, the first kind of land cannot
be lost, reallocated or transferred by collective authorities, while the second kind can
be seized and transferred to other agents from period to period, if a reallocation occurs.
We will denote by s the share of “grain ration land” in the first period land endowment.
We thus have TG1 = sT1 and TR1 = (1− s)T1.
To sum up, the initial endowment of a rural household is given by the set (L, TG1, TR1),
or, alternatively, (L, T1, s).
First Period
During the first period, the household allocates labor between the rural activity and
migration. We assume that the rural activity involves the use of land and labor, and
that the agent acts as a private entrepreneur. So the rural activity yields an income
F (T1, (1 −m)L), and migration provides a total income mLw, where m is the share of
the household working time spent migrating, 1−m being the time devoted to the rural
activity. F (T, (1 −m)L) is the household rural production function. We assume that
F (.) is increasing and concave in both arguments.9. Finally, w is the migrant wage. The
agent’s first period income is then a function of m:
W1(m) = F (T1, (1−m)L) +mLw (1)
9Note that we take “grain ration land” and “responsibility land” as perfect substitutes in production.
However, even if they differ in quality or other productive characteristics, that does not modify our main
result.
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Second Period
During the second period, the household cannot migrate; its whole income is thus gen-
erated through the rural activity, which yields an income F (T2, L). Moreover, its first
period responsibility land, TR1, may have been reallocated between the two periods. We
thus have T2 = TG2 + TR2, with TG2 = TG1 = sT1, because grain ration land is secure,
and TR2 = f(.)TR1 = f(.)(1 − s)T1, where the function f(.) captures the changes in
responsibility land through redistribution.
From the above, it follows that f(.) will depend on time spent migrating in the first
period, (1−m)L, the function f(.) being decreasing in m, and on collective management
of land, Z. As mentioned earlier, villages’ policies on land vary, and land rights are more
secure in some places than in others. For this study, and for the reasons given earlier,
we will use the fact that village authorities have retained some “flexible land” as an
indication that there is administrative involvement in land management, and thus land
rights insecurity for households.
Thus, second period income is:
W2(m) =F (sT1 + f(Z, (1−m)L)(1− s)T1, L) (2)
Migration Decision
The rural household decides the optimal allocation of its labor during the first period so
as to maximize its intertemporal income10 (which equals its intertemporal utility, with
a discount rate taken as equal to one).
10To simplify our analysis, we have not introduced savings. Doing so and maximizing household’s
intertemporal consumption gives similar results.
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Using (1) and (2), the maximization program of the agent is:
max
m
W =F (T1, (1−m)L) +mLw
+ F ([s+ (1− s)f(Z, (1−m)L)]T1, L) (3)
s.t. 1 ≥ m ≥ 0
2.2 Land Rights Insecurity and Migration
Optimal Labor Allocation and Optimal Migration Duration
The agent’s optimization program yields two corner solutions, m = 0 and m = 1. When
m = 0, no time is devoted to migration. It is more profitable for the household to spend
all its first-period working time in the rural area, because the marginal productivity of
rural labor is higher than the marginal income of migration, that is the urban informal
sector wage. When m = 1, all working time is spent out-migrating. It is more prof-
itable for the household to spend all its first-period working time migrating, because
the marginal productivity of its rural labor is always lower than the marginal income of
migration.
The interior solution, such that 0 < m∗ < 1, satisfies the condition:
− F2(T1, (1−m∗)L) + w (4)
− (1− s)T1f2(Z, (1−m∗)L)F1 ([s+ (1− s)f(Z, (1−m∗)L)]T1, L) = 0
where F1, F2 and f2 are the partial derivatives of F (.) and f(.) with respect to their
first and second argument.
In the case where land rights are secure, the time spent out-migrating during the
first period does not affect the quantity of land available in the second period, formally
f2 = 0, and so the optimal migration duration simply equates the marginal income of
the rural activity, F2, and the marginal income earned on the urban labor market, w.
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If land use rights are not secure, that generates a new migration cost. This cost is
formally equal to f2TR1F1, that is to say it is equal to the marginal productivity of land
in the second period, F1, multiplied by the marginal gain or loss of “responsibility land”
quantity due to out-migration, f2(1 − s)T1. Quite intuitively, this cost is the marginal
income loss caused by the loss of land due to out-migration.
Land Rights Insecurity and Optimal Migration Duration
Equation (4) implicitly defines the optimal migration decisions m∗ as a function of the
quantity of land and of the productivity in the rural activity, T1, T2 and F1, F2, of the
migrant wage, w, and of land rights insecurity, through s, the structure of the land
endowment according to the contractual status of plots, and through the possible loss
of responsibility land due to out-migration, f2(Z, (1−m∗)L)(1− s)T1.
There are thus two dimensions of land rights insecurity that bear consequences for
migration decisions, the first one at the household level, the second at the village level.
Our econometric estimation will be based on these two dimensions.
At the village-level, we will use the fact that village authorities retained some “reserve
fields” in 2002 as an indication of their actual involvement in land management and plot
distribution among households. We will denote by R the existence (R = 1) or not
(R = 0) of these “reserve fields”. This dummy thus indicates whether there is insecurity
at the village level.
At the household level, we use s, the share of grain ration land in a household land
holding. The higher s, the more secure is the household land, as “Grain ration land”
quantity does not vary, whereas “Responsibility land” quantity can change due to village
leaders’ decisions, and this change will depend on the migration decision. s can thus be
seen as indicating the exposure of a household land endowment to land rights insecurity.
Formally, we can express these hypotheses as follows:
If R = 0, TG2 = TG1 = sT1 and TR2 = TR1 = (1− s)T1 (i.e., f(.) is constant),
If R = 1, TG2 = TG1 = sT1, TR2 = f(Z, (1 −m)L)TR1 = f(Z, (1 −m)L)(1 − s)T1
(ie, f(.) is not a constant, and depends on the migration duration). Moreover, we add
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the assumption that f2 > 0: the time spent at home positively affects the quantity of
“responsibility land” available in the second period.
From the expression (4) and the above-mentioned assumptions, we get the following
results:11
∂m∗
∂s
= 0 if R = 0 (ie land rights are secure). (5)
∂m∗
∂s
> 0 if R = 1 (ie land rights are jeopardized). (6)
If land rights are secure and not jeopardized, the contractual structure of the agent’s
land endowment, between “responsibility” plots and “grain ration” plots, should have
no effect on migration decisions. This result is quite intuitive, for the main difference
between the two kinds of plots is their exposure to insecurity and administrative redis-
tribution. On the contrary, if land plots can be reallocated among villagers, the share of
“grain ration land” in an agent’s land holding should have a positive effect on the share
of working time she can spend migrating, because when land rights are jeopardized, only
“responsibility land” is likely to shrink. An agent with a larger share of “grain ration
land” in her land holding is thus less exposed to land rights insecurity. She can afford
to migrate more, as she is less constrained by the need to be in her village asserting her
rights and defending her interests. This interaction between land rights insecurity at the
village level and the contractual structure of households’ land plots is the key element
of our econometric estimation.
3 Empirical Results
Our model has led to a set of implications about the link between land rights insecurity
and migration duration. In this section, we first describe our identification strategy and
then present our results.
11See Appendix A for the proof.
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3.1 Econometric Specification
To investigate the impact of land rights insecurity on migration decision, we have to deal
with two main econometric issues: endogeneity and censoring. This subsection aims
to show how our strategy, implemented within a semiparametric censored regression
framework, will solve both of them.
Identification Strategy
The main factor of land rights insecurity is village land insecurity among households.
Yet, looking at the impact of land manipulation on villagers’ migration decisions raises
an endogeneity problem. Indeed, village land manipulation and villagers’ migration de-
cision can both be caused by village-level unobserved characteristics. Besides, it is likely
that reverse causality takes place between land management and migration, for if a land
seizure can have an impact on migration decisions, it is also possible that villagers’
migration behaviors have an effect on village’s management of land. In our empirical
inquiry, we solve this endogeneity problem by using the interaction between land ma-
nipulation and the contractual structure of household land. Alone, the type of tenure
of household land holdings might not be exogenous. For instance, there could be some
systematic bias in village policies towards grain ration land. But despite being subject
to heterogenous policies between villages, grain ration land will always be considered as
more secure than other types of land at the household level. Moreover, the influence
of grain ration land on households’ migration decisions should be the same in all the
villages if none of them have reserve fields, once household characteristics and village
effects have been taken into account. This provides us with a key hypothesis in our
identification strategy. To express this formally, let us consider the following reduced
form, that gives the share of household working time devoted to migration, m, according
to our model.
m(T, s,R,X,Z) = αT + λX + γR+ βRs×R+ βs+ 
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X represents observed household characteristics. R is the dummy indicating the fact
that village authorities retained “reserve fields” in 2002. T is the amount of land used by
the household, while s gives the share of “grain ration land” in total land plots. s×R,
the interaction between R and s, is the term of interest. Finally,  is the error term.
As mentioned before, we have E(|s,R) 6= 0. Our key assumption is that the error
term is separable between s and v, with v indexing the villages.
E(|s, v) = s + v (7)
That is to say, two households with similar X and T but different shares of grain
ration land, s and s′, will have the same difference in  on both types of village, either
with R = 1 or R = 0. Hypothesis (7) implies:
∀(s, s′), E(|s′, R = 1)− E(|s,R = 1) = E(|s′, R = 0)− E(|s,R = 0) (8)
Our hypothesis, somewhat similar to the parallel trend hypothesis in a difference-in-
difference strategy, as (8) shows, allows us to exploit the interaction term s× R. After
replacing the error term by its two components, the expectation of migration duration
becomes :
E(m|v, T, s,X,R) = αT + λX + γR+ βRs×R+ βs+ s + v
Conditioning on the village fixed effects, v, the exogeneity of other independent
variables (T and X) is not a concern, and βR becomes our unique indicator of migration
response to land insecurity. Indeed, it is clear that nothing can be said about the impact
of each dimension of land insecurity, taken alone.
Obviously, β is not identified.
∂m
∂s
= 0 if R = 0 will not be tested.
It is clear as well that we cannot disentangle the land seizure effect, γ, from the
village fixed effects, v: the latter will include the former.
∂m
∂R
< 0 cannot be tested
either.
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Yet, we can test one important implication of the model : βR > 0. Provided sufficient
variation in s within villages of both R = 1 and R = 0 types, βR is identified, as implied
from (7).
The structure of land endowment according to types of land tenure thus allows us
to identify the effect of land rights insecurity on households’ migration decisions. The
interaction of the occurrence of land retention with the proportion of grain ration land
in household land holdings provides us with a way of overcoming the land manipulation
endogeneity problem.
Censored regression model with fixed effects
The second problem we have to face is the censoring of our dependent variable, m, the
share of household working time spent migrating. Obviously, m, the share we observe
in our data, cannot be less than 0 or greater than 1.
The upper censoring is not a concern. Indeed, the share of migrant work is equal
to one for only twenty-two households. Rural households, given their size (they often
contain several generations), and given the constraints they face, are very unlikely to
have all their members working all year as migrants. Whether or not we exclude them
has little effect on our results. We therefore choose not to deal with the upper censoring.
Our main preoccupation is the left censoring, affecting nearly 70% of the households.
To take into account the censoring, we implement a semi-parametric estimator for
censored model with fixed effects described by Honore´ (1992), the Identically Censored
Least Squares estimator (ICLS).12 To do so, we need a narrow set of hypotheses. We
assume the error terms to be independent, identically and continuously distributed con-
ditional on the independent variables and on the village fixed effect. Having no para-
metric hypotheses on the error terms is of particular interest as we have to deal with
left-censoring. We use the downhill simplex method as optimization routine.13
12Honore´ (1992) proposes two estimators, depending on whether the objective function is based on
least absolute deviation or on least squares. We choose the latter, more appropriate when the censoring
level of the dependent variable is high.
13The implementation mainly relies on the programs written by Bo Honore´ for GAUSS. Four opti-
mization routines are provided: the downhill simplex method, Powell’s method, the conjugate gradient
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3.2 Empirical Results
First Insights
As explained above, our empirical investigation uses the interaction between village land
insecurity and the contractual status of household land holdings to identify the impact
of land rights insecurity on migration duration.
Confidence in the actual impact of this interaction can be derived first from the
following graphs. In figures 2 and 3, we plot the distribution of households including
at least one migrant worker, according to the share of their working time devoted to
migration. We plot separately this distribution for the households who have some grain
ration land, and for those who do not. Figure 2 shows migration patterns for these two
kinds of households in 2002 for villages where no “flexible land” was retained that year,
whereas figure 3 displays the same distributions, but for villages where some “flexible
land” was retained by village authorities.
FIGURE 2 HERE
FIGURE 3 HERE
From the comparison between these two figures, it appears that while the owning of
some grain ration land does not seem to have a strong impact on households’ migration
decisions in villages where no “flexible land” is retained (figure 2), it shifts the share of
working time devoted to migration to the right when some “flexible land” is actually
retained by village authorities (figure 3). Grain ration land thus seems to allow a house-
hold to migrate more when land rights are insecure in a village, that is to say, grain
ration land seems to act as a protection when land rights are jeopardized.
We now turn to the formal econometric analysis of the effect on migration decisions
of this interaction between village uncertainty and the contractual status of plots.
method of Polak and Ribiere, and the Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (BFGS) method. We use the
downhill simplex method because it is better at minimizing the objective function.
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Variables
The dependent variable According to our theoretical framework, we consider house-
holds’ working time, and we focus on the share of this working time allocated to mi-
gration. More specifically, the dependent variable m is, for a given household, the time
spent working out of the county, divided by the time spent working, for all the workers
of that household. In our sample, the time allotted to migration by households is, on
average, 10%.
Land variables The key land variables are the total area of land used by the house-
hold, the share of grain ration land in total land, and the interaction between the share
of grain ration land and the village-level land insecurity variable, namely whether or not
the village retained some “flexible land” in 2002.
A household’s land endowment is 9.7 mu on average, with grain ration land ac-
counting for 39% of that. As mentioned earlier, 23% of sampled villages retained some
“flexible land” in 2002.
Households characteristics In our theoretical framework, we have identified impor-
tant household-level characteristics. Among them, the migration wage and the house-
hold’s ability to work cannot appear directly in the reduced form. The variables we use
are the reduced form determinants: years of education of the head of household, the
proportion of men among working members, mean age and mean age squared.
Additional Household Controls As control variables, we add three households vari-
ables in some specifications: the share of dependent members (young and old) in the
household, a dummy associated with households from ethnic minorities, and a wealth
indicator built from the durable goods possessed by household.
Tables 7 in the appendix presents descriptive statistics for all variables.
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Results
Baseline regression results are presented in table 3.
TABLE 3 HERE
As we can see, the coefficient of the interaction between land rights insecurity and
grain ration land is found to be positive, amounts to 0.19, and is significant at the 2%
level. This result strongly confirms our main hypothesis: we actually get βR > 0. The
coefficient of the interaction term shows that land rights insecurity acts as a hindrance on
migration. When land is manipulated by village authorities, a household whose plots are
less exposed to reallocation because of its status can afford a longer migration duration.
This also reveals that land endowments are still an important variable in household
migration decisions.
What does the magnitude of the coefficient mean? Since our dependent variable
is censored, we can obtain information on both the latent variable and the observed
variable. The coefficient 0.19 gives information on the impact of the interaction term
on the desired migration duration, m?. Let us consider a fictive average household,
whose working time amounts to 745 days. If flexible land is retained at the village level,
an additional percentage point of secure grain ration land in total land endowment will
increase the desired share of working time devoted to migration by 0.19 percentage point.
This amounts to 0.0019 ∗ 745 = 1.4 additional days of migration.
To get the magnitude of the marginal effect on the actual migration duration, addi-
tional calculation is required. As Honore´ (2008) stated, the average marginal effect on
the dependent variable m is obtained by multiplying the coefficient by the probability
that m is not censored14. Migration duration is uncensored with a probability of 0.29.
Therefore, if land rights are insecure, an additional percentage point of grain ration land
share will increase migration duration by 0.29 ∗ 0.0019 ∗ 745 = 0.4 day. Let us consider
two households, whose grain ration land shares differ by a standard deviation. If land
rights are jeopardized, the migration differential between them would be 15 days. This
14Provided that the censoring points do not change while considering a change in the independent
variable of interest. This condition is satisfied here.
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is a significant variation, for an average household allocates 10.2% of its working time
to migration, which amounts to 76 days.
Among the other variables, total land area has a slight negative impact on migration
duration. This result is quite intuitive, since as Zhao (1999b) stated, land scarcity is a
considerable push factor. However, unlike Zhao (1999b), we are not concerned here with
the binary decision of migration, as we focus on migration duration. More land naturally
increases the productivity of agricultural labor, and thus reduces both the probability
to migrate and the time devoted to migration.
Regarding the other variables, the results obtained are consistent with our expec-
tations. The share of grain ration land, alone, has no significant effect on migration
duration. The share of dependent members is found to have quite a strong and negative
impact on migration duration (−0.23), significant at the 1% level. Education and age
variables are also significant, at the five and ten percent level respectively. The higher
the education level of the head of household, the shorter the migration duration. This
confirms numerous studies showing that local off-farm jobs are scarce and that the most
highly-educated people will have more opportunities to work in local off-farm jobs. Lo-
cal off-farm work is usually their first best choice (see Guang and Zheng (2005)). The
younger the household is on average, the larger the share of its working time devoted to
migration. The dummy associated with ethnic minority is non significant. One explana-
tion may be that ethnical diversity within village may be small, and the effect of ethnic
origins may be entangled in village fixed effects.
Wealth indicators prove to be non significant, except for the dummy associated with
the wealthiest households, significant at the 1% level. The wealthiest households migrate
less. This is consistent with previous studies, pointing out that the wealthiest households
have neither the need nor the desire to migrate. Among the selected controls, the
variables related to wealth are of particular concern. On the one hand, one could argue
that wealth indicators are endogenous. The purchase of durable goods can be a result of
migration history. On the other hand, one could be surprised by their low significance,
and fear that they fail to capture differences between households’ ability to pay migration
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costs or to undertake productive activities. Among the three dummies included in the
regression, the last one (motorbike or car ownership) is the only significant one. Yet
it is desirable to control for all the variables explaining the different choices faced by
the household. To answer our first concern, we run the same regression without wealth
indicators, and find no significant alteration of our coefficient of interest. Results are
displayed in the same table, under the label ICLS (2). Once wealth indicators are
omitted, the coefficient of our variable of interest is equal to 0.18, and remains significant
at the 5% level. As for our second concern, to check whether our variable properly
captures wealth impacts on migration, we try using different wealth controls. We run
the same regressions, with and without dummies for durable goods, adding the estimated
value of self-owned house (columns (3) and (4)). Results are not altered. The coefficient
of this variable is positive. In the absence of dummies for durable goods, it is significant
at the 10% level. The richer the household is, the longer the migration duration will be,
the very upper fringe remaining the exception.
Still, these wealth indicators may fail to account properly for the capital that a
household owns and can use in its farming activity. As agricultural production plays
a crucial role in our model, we run additional regressions with different controls, the
results of which are shown in table 4. One relevant variable is the value of household
fixed productive assets. The fixed assets related to agricultural production encompass
draught animals, farm tools, and machinery. We run a similar regression by adding the
value of these fixed productive assets. Their effect on migration decisions is strongly
significant, and has, as expected, a negative sign. To better understand what type of
fixed productive assets are of importance, we add each item separately. As column (6),
(7) and (8) of table 4 show, the effect of these assets is largely driven by farm tools and
machinery. Draught animals alone have no significant impact; they probably do not help
differentiate between different households in a village.
TABLE 4 HERE
The estimated value of household fixed productive assets captures wealth as well as
capital used in agricultural production. In this case, the dummies related to durable
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goods may not be sufficient to capture household wealth. We add to the regression
a variable that captures wealth in a continuous way, the estimated value of self-owned
house. Results are shown in table 5, column (9). Productive assets still have a significant
and negative impact, and the significance and value of the coefficient of the interaction
between grain ration land and the retention of flexible land increases, whereas the land
variable becomes less significant. The value of productive fixed assets is indeed likely
to be collinear with the size of land. Keeping in mind the possibility of endogeneity, we
remain cautious in interpreting such variables. However, we see from these additional
regressions that results are quite robust when the indicators used for wealth are omitted
or enriched with additional types of wealth controls.
TABLE 5 HERE
3.3 Robustness checks
In this section, we present two sets of additional regressions in order to assess the ro-
bustness of our results.
Social status
In the theoretical framework we have designed, local off-farm work is not an option
considered by the household. This simplification relies on the assumption that the trade-
off between local off-farm work and migration is of less importance than the trade-off
between migration and agriculture. The household which has access to local off-farm
work will take advantage of it, and the remaining working time will then be subject
to a choice between agriculture and migration. Migration is mostly seen as a second-
best option, as Guang and Zheng (2005) observed. Therefore, the choice of migration
duration should not be affected very much by the duration of local off-farm work. Yet,
the total working time of each household includes off-farm work as well as migration
and agriculture. And even if only a limited number of households in our sample are
involved in both off-farm work and migration, local off-farm work is an alternative to
rural households, that could call into question our modeling. The dependent variable
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being a ratio, if our hypothesis is not correct, then variations in household working time
devoted to local off-farm work would affect the migration working time. In this case, the
addition of variables that are of essential importance in explaining access to local off-farm
work would change our results substantially. An interesting control to add is a variable
accounting for the household social status. In the context of a rural economy lacking
off-farm job opportunities, social status is of strong importance in facilitating access to
off-farm jobs. Communist Party membership, in China, helps to identify households
more likely to get access to interesting local off-farm positions. Whereas its impact on
migration is not clear and appears to be insignificant, the CCP membership variable is
likely to play a key role in explaining access to local off-farm jobs. As far as migration
is concerned, even if social status does play a role, it is likely that its impact depends
mainly on existing networks and on the migration history of the village, and most of the
effects at play should therefore be captured by the village fixed effects.
We therefore run a regression adding a dummy indicating whether the head of house-
hold belongs to the Chinese Communist Party. If off-farm work substantially affected
household working time allotted to migration duration, one would expect this variable
to have a significant effect or to alter the coefficients obtained previously for other vari-
ables. In fact, the inclusion of this variable does not alter our results, as shown by the
ICLS (10) regressions of table 5, and this variable is found to be non-significant. A
comparison with the first regression (ICLS (1)) shows that the variables of interest have
identical coefficients. The results are consistent with our analysis. We are not claiming,
however, that social status has no impact on migration duration. It is possible that the
social status has two offsetting effects, people with better connections being either rich
enough not to need to migrate, or well enough connected to village leaders not to fear
land seizure if they do out-migrate. Nevertheless, this regression makes us confident that
the simplifications made in our theoretical framework are reasonable. The addition of a
key variable impacting local off-farm working opportunities does not alter the coefficient
of the variables of interest. Our conclusion is not jeopardized.
28
Off-farm work and migration
Our main robustness check aims to assess the relevance of our identification strategy.
In this paper, we have argued that rural migrants may be deprived of some of their
land because they are away from their villages, and are thus not present to defend
their rights. We have claimed that the interaction between the retention of collective
“flexible land” by village authorities in 2002 and the proportion of grain ration land in
a household’s total land holdings enables to identify the impact of land insecurity on
migration decisions.
However, it could be possible that the significant and positive impact of this interac-
tion term on migration behaviors is not due to land rights insecurity issues, penalizing
absent individuals, but that it is caused by other reasons, affecting the general trade-off
between agricultural work and off-farm work, local or out of the village.
If that was the case, the interaction term would be correlated not only with migra-
tion, but, more generally, with off-farm work, local or not. It would thus be positively
correlated, not only with migration behaviors, but also with local off-farm work. On
the other hand, if the interaction term does identify the impact of land rights insecu-
rity, then its impact on the time allocated to local off-farm work should be small, if not
insignificant. After all, individuals working off-farm but locally can be present to assert
their rights and defend their interests if their rights are jeopardized.
As a robustness check, to verify that this interaction term captures the effect of
land rights insecurity, we run a regression almost identical to the preceding ones, except
that we take as dependent variable not the ratio of the time spent migrating to total
working time, but the ratio of local off-farm work to total working time. In our sample,
on average, households spent 22% of their working time in local off-farm jobs. If the
coefficient associated with the interaction term is negligible or insignificant, that would
confirm that our previous results actually identify an impact of land rights insecurity on
migration.
Results are presented in Table 6. Whatever the specification, the coefficient associ-
ated with the interaction is much lower than in the previous regression : 0.07. With a
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standard deviation of 0.05, it is found to be non-significant. These regressions therefore
strongly confirm our previous results.
TABLE 6 HERE
It is also interesting to note that local off-farm working time responds in a slightly
different way to the different independent variables. The dummies associated with house-
hold durable goods are more significant. The dummies for two bicycles and for motorbike
or car are both significant at the 1% level: wealth seems to matter more for access to
local off-farm jobs than for migration opportunities. The social status variable is found
to have a highly significant positive impact, with a coefficient of 0.08. The strong impact
of Communist Party membership on local off-farm opportunities confirms some of the
interpretations proposed above.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the effect of land rights insecurity on the migration decisions
of rural people, and more specifically on migration duration. The underlying idea,
formalized in a simple model, is that in a context where collective authorities can seize
and reallocate land plots, the more time an individual spends out of her village, the more
likely she is to lose at least some of her land. Future land holdings are thus endogenous
as they depend on present migration duration. Moreover, land use rights insecurity in
China is idiosyncratic, depending as it does on village-level management of collective
land and on the contractual status of plots. The effect of out-migration duration on
changes in land holdings is thus not the same for all rural people, and the consequent
constraint on migration is more acute for some than for others.
The empirical results drawn from a 2002 CASS survey data using a semiparametric
censored regression model strongly support these views. It appears that, when land
use rights are jeopardized, migration behavior varies with the contractual structure of
land holdings. When land is manipulated by village authorities, households having more
secure grain ration land plots can afford to spend more time migrating.
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It is well known that land rights insecurity has a strong effect on rural households’
investment decisions. We show here that land rights insecurity also influences house-
holds’ labor allocation. Insecure and inalienable land rights act as a centripetal force,
preventing rural people from moving out of agriculture and out of rural areas.
The results we obtained here also stress that the “floating” characteristic of rural
migrants in China is not only due to the administrative constraints on definitive settling
in urban areas, through the hukou registration system, but is also a consequence of the
institutional arrangements in rural areas. If rural migrants do not settle in cities, but
keep moving back and forth between home villages and destination areas, it is not only
because cities push them back, but also because their home villages actually pull them
back.
However, even if land rights insecurity is a manifest constraint on the labor allocation
of rural households, one should not unilaterally conclude that Chinese institutional land
arrangements should be merely removed, and land rights privatized.
Firstly, it is not clear that if land rights were privatized and controls on population
moves loosened, rural people would take the individually and socially optimal decisions
on their labor allocation. Actually, one of the main arguments of the Chinese State
against freeing land and labor allocations is the fear of “blind migrations” (mangliu) by
rural people to the cities.
Secondly, the effects of Chinese land arrangements are not limited solely to the di-
mension of rural labor allocation. It is possible that this constraint they impose on rural
households is counterbalanced by advantages in other areas. Indeed it appears that
Chinese farmers did not, at least in the end of the 1990s, generally seem to favor an evo-
lution toward privatization, as James Kai-sing Kung and Liu Shouying (see Kung James
(1995) and Kung and Liu (1997)) were the first to notice when they investigated Chinese
farmers’ preferences. It is thus possible that these drawbacks of the collective ownership
of land are seen, in Chinese rural areas, as the price to pay for still under-studied gains
from this institutional framework. For example, even if land use rights on particular
plots are not guaranteed over time, the collective management of land secures an access
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to agricultural land for any rural individual. It could thus constitute an insurance device
for Chinese rural people, who, generally speaking, bitterly lack all kinds of social security
services. Our study results appear to back such an intuition, for the huge proportion of
people who tend to cut short their stay in cities when a reallocation occurs proves how
much they rely on the land. Even if land itself may not be sufficient to provide a living
for a household, and even if farming households hope to find off-farm occupations, at
home as well as in distant cities, it remains a protection when the future is uncertain.
A Comparative statics: The effect of the share of grain-
ration plots in total land endowment, s, on the optimal
share of working time spent migrating, m∗, depending
on village-level land rights insecurity, R.
We want to prove that:
∂m∗
∂s
= 0 if R = 0 (ie land rights are secure).
∂m∗
∂s
> 0 if R = 1 (ie land rights are insecure).
From equation (3), we know that the objective function of the household C depends
on the choice variable m and the parameter s, with (m, s) ∈ [0; 1]2:
C(m, s) = F (T1, (1−m)L) +mLw + F ([s+ (1− s)f(Z, (1−m)L)]T1, L)
When land rights are secure (R = 0), the quantity of land does not change from
the first to the second period, f(.) = 1, the objective function is simply:
C(m, s) = F (T1, (1−m)L) +mLw + F (T1, L)
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C(.) therefore does not depend on s, and so, obviously, the optimal m does not depend
on s either. We thus have our first result:
∂m∗
∂s
= 0 if R = 0
When land rights are insecure (R = 1), the quantity of land does change from the
first to the second period, and this evolution is captured by the function f(.). We make
the following assumptions on this function.
When m > 0, f(.) is increasing in the share of working time spent in the rural
area, or, alternatively, decreasing in m. Moreover, we assume that f(.) < 1. Indeed,
f(.) > 1 would mean that the household would actually gain more “responsibility land”
during an administrative reallocation of plots. This is not likely to be the case, for out-
migrating households are always a minority of a village population, and the only likely
redistribution of land is from less frequently present people to more frequently present
ones. There is no chance that a household with an out-migrating member could gain
more land. So we can assume that f(.) < 1 if m > 0.
When m = 0, f(.) ≥ 1 for the same reasons as expressed above: the only likely
redistribution of land is from less frequently present people to more frequently present
ones, and so households that do not migrate at all should gain, or at least not lose,
“responsibility land”.
To sum up, we assume that f(.) is continuously differentiable, increasing in the
working time spent in the rural area (i.e., decreasing in m), and inferior to 1 when
m ∈]0; 1]. However, f(.) displays a discontinuity for m = 0, and f(L) ≥ 1.
When m ∈]0; 1], we know that m∗(s) = arg maxm∈[0;1[C(m, s), where C(.) is contin-
uously differentiable in m, and the cross partial derivative of C(m, s) is:
− T1f2(Z, (1−m)L) [−F1 ([s+ (1− s)f(Z, (1−m)L)]T1, L)
+(1− s)T1(1− f(Z, (1−m)L))F 21 ([s+ (1− s)f(Z, (1−m)L)]T1, L)
]
> 0
for f2 > 0, F1 > 0, (1− s)T1 ≥ 0, F 21 ≤ 0, because of the decreasing returns of the rural
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activity, and finally f(.) < 1.
C(m, s) therefore has strictly increasing differences in (m, s), and, by Topkis theo-
rem15, we get our result:
∂m∗
∂s > 0 if R = 1 and for m > 0.
To show that the previous property holds on the whole segment [0; 1], that is, includ-
ing the case m = 0, we have to establish that C has increasing differences even when m
is at its boundary 0. We take two values of m, 0 and m > 0 and two values of s, s and
s, with s > s. We then have:
(C(m, s)− C(0, s))− (C(m, s)− C(0, s))
=F ([s+ (1− s)f(Z, (1−m)L)]T1, L)− F ([s+ (1− s)f(Z, (1−m)L)]T1, L)
+F ([s+ (1− s)f(Z,L)]T1, L)− F ([s+ (1− s)f(Z,L)]T1, L)
Which is positive, for s > s, f(V, (1 − m)L) < 1 ≤ f(V,L), and F (.) is increasing in
both arguments. C(.) thus has increasing differences for all m ∈ [0; 1].
We then get our second result:
∂m∗
∂s
> 0 if R = 1
B Descriptive Statistics
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Figure 1: Migration days - density (Sample restricted to migrant individuals).
Figure 2: Share of household working time spent migrating depending on households’
contractual status of land plots when no “flexible land” was retained
Figure 3: Share of household working time spent migrating depending on households’
contractual status of land plots when some “flexible land” was retained
Primary work place Percentage of workers
Agricultural work (within village) 52,68
Within village 16,55
Outside village, within township 10,31
Outside township, within county 5,59
Outside county, within province 6,78
Outside province 8,10
Total 100%
Table 1: Primary work place
Table 2: Descriptive statistics on labor force
Variable Migrants Non migrants All workers
Mean
Age 28,7 40,2 38,6
Years of education 8,7 7,4 7,6
Proportion (%)
Men 66,6 52,8 54,8
Married 48,5 82,5 38,6
Household’s head 23,9 38,6 36,5
Number of obs. 3404 20425 23829
Table 3: Dependent variable: Ratio of migration duration to total working time (1)
Identically Censored Least Squares Regressions
Model ICLS (1) ICLS (2) ICLS (3) ICLS (4)
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Total area of land -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.001)
Share of grain ration land -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Flexible land retained in 2002 0.19∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
× Share of grain ration land (0.075) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074)
Share of dependent members -0.23∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.03) (0.03)
Years of education of hh head -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Hh mean age -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Hh mean age squared 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Hh mean number of men 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ethnic minority 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Household durable goods yes no no yes
(ref: three or more bikes)
One bicycle -0.05 -0.05∗
(0.029) (0.028)
Two bicycles -0.01 -0.02
(0.02) (0.018)
Motorbike or car -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Estimated value of 6.8 E-7∗ 8 E-7∗∗
self-owned house (3.5 E-7) (3.5 E-7)
χ2 test for joint significance 422 393.7 415 441
(p-val=0%) (p-val=0%) (p-val=0%) (p-val=0%)
Number of villages : 862 862 862 862
Number of households : 8005 8005 8005 8005
Significance levels: ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Table 4: Dependent variable: Ratio of migration duration to total working time (2)
Identically Censored Least Squares Regressions
Model ICLS (5) ICLS (6) ICLS (7) ICLS (8)
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Total area of land -0.002∗∗ -0.003∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012)
Share of grain ration land -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)
Flexible land retained in 2002 0.18∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.19∗∗ 0.19∗∗
× Share of grain ration land (0.072) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
Share of dependent members -0.23∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.029)
Years of education of hh head -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
Hh mean age -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Hh mean age squared 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Hh mean number of men 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ethnic minority -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Household durable goods
(ref: three or more bikes)
One bicycle -0.05∗ -0.05 -0.05 -0.05∗
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Two bicycles -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
(0.018) (0.02) (0.02) (0.018)
Motorbike or car -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Value of hh fixed productive assets sum item item item
Draught animals, farm tools, -8.3 E-6∗∗∗
machinery and equipment (2.6 E-6)
Draught animals -6.7 E-6
(6.6 E-6)
Large and medium sized farm -6.5 E-5∗∗∗
tools (2.2 E-5)
Machinery and equipment -8.3 E-6∗∗∗
(3 E-6)
χ2 test for joint significance 422.3 414.9 442.1 421. 3
(p-val=0%) (p-val=0%) (p-val=0%) (p-val=0%)
Number of villages : 862 862 862 862
Number of households : 8005 8005 8005 8005
Significance levels: ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Table 5: Dependent variable: Ratio of migration duration to total working time (3)
ICLS Regressions
Model ICLS (9) ICLS (10)
Variables Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Total area of land -0.002∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0012)
Share of grain ration land -0.04 -0.04
(0.038) (0.039)
Flexible land retained in 2002 0.199∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗
× Share of grain ration land (0.072) (0.074)
Share of dependent members -0.24∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.029)
Years of education of hh head -0.006∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023)
Hh mean age -0.03∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Hh mean age squared 0.00013∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00006) (0.00006)
Hh mean number of men 0.009 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Ethnic minority -0.04 -0.02
(0.06) (0.06)
Household durable goods
(ref: three or more bikes)
One bicycle -0.05∗∗ -0.05∗∗
(0.028) (0.028)
Two bicycles -0.02 -0.02
(0.018) (0.018)
Motorbike or car -0.06∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Value of hh fixed productive assets yes no
Draught animals, farm tools, -5.9 E-6∗∗
machinery and equipment (2.4 E-6)
Estimated value of self-owned house 8.3 E-7∗∗
(3.6 E-7)
Social status variable no yes
Hh head belongs to CCP 0.007
(0.015)
χ2 test for joint significance 433.9 416.8
(p-val=0%) (p-val=0%)
Number of villages : 862 862
Number of households : 8005 8005
Significance levels: ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Table 6: Dependent variable: Ratio of local off farm work to total working time
ICLS Regressions
Model ICLS (11) ICLS (12) ICLS (13)
Variables Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
Total area of land -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.007∗∗∗
(0.0015 ) (0.0014 ) (0.0016 )
Share of grain ration land -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032)
Flexible land retained in 2002 0.075 0.075 0.075
× Share of grain ration land (0.05) (0.049) (0.049)
Share of dependent members 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021)
Years of education of hh head 0.016∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Hh mean age 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0035)
Hh mean age squared -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00004)
Hh mean number of men -0.004 -0.0008 -0.005
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Ethnic minority -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Household durable goods yes no yes
(ref: three or more bikes)
One bicycle -0.03 -0.03
(0.021) (0.021)
Two bicycles -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012)
Motorbike or car 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011)
Social status variable no no yes
Hh head belongs to the CCP 0.08∗∗∗
(0.01)
χ2 test for joint significance 229.3 169.6 295.6
(p-val=0%) (p-val=0%) (p-val=0%)
Number of villages : 862 862 862
Number of households : 8005 8005 8005
Significance levels: ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Table 7: Descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest.
Households All With Without
migrant worker(s) migrant worker(s)
Variables Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Share of hh working time de-
voted to:
Migration 0.1 0.193 0.36 0.195 0 0
Local off-farm work 0.22 0.286 0.07 0.139 0.28 0.308
Total area of land 9.28 9.781 8.3 8.45 9.68 10.249
Share of grain ration land 0.39 0.377 0.42 0.373 0.37 0.378
Years of education of hh head 7.16 2.608 6.9 2.603 7.27 2.603
Share of dependent members 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.214 0.33 0.234
Hh mean number of men 0.57 0.197 0.55 0.18 0.57 0.203
Hh mean age 39.07 8.112 36.86 6.051 39.97 8.655
Hh mean age squared 1684.9 713.095 1528.72 505.32 1748.6 773.181
Ethnic minority 0.12 0.1 0.13
Hh durable goods - Proportion
of hhs having:
One bicycle 0.18 0.21 0.16
Two bicycles 0.28 0.31 0.27
Three or more bicycles 0.26 0.28 0.27
Motorbike or car 0.28 0.2 0.3
Value of hh fixed productive as-
sets (Yuan):
Draught animals 727 1825 568 1160 797 2030
Farm tools 250 1034 227 368 259 1203
Machinery and equipment 1087 3210 689 1848 1248 3607
Sum of three previous items 2063 3987 1484 2304 2298 4472
Estimated value of house 23485 28591 21435 22827 24316 30584
Hh head belongs to CCP 0.17 0.15 0.18
Number of households 8005 2319 5686
All samples are restricted to households having some land and having at least one working member.
